Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 3

Article 13

1996

Living in a Constitutional Moment: Lopez and Constitutional
Theory ?
Mark Tushnet

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment: Lopez and Constitutional Theory ?, 46 Case W. Rsrv. L.
Rev. 845 (1996)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol46/iss3/13

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

LIVING IN A CONSTITUTIONAL
MOMENT?: LOPEZ AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Mark Tushnet"
By the time the justices met to discuss United States v.
Lopez,' the votes were already in. Republicans had gained control
of both houses of Congress. Their Contract With America promised
a substantial change in the national government's role in the lives
of many Americans.2 Under the circumstances, one might imagine

the justices upholding the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Philip
Bobbitt's explanation for an occasional judicial assertion of the
power to invalidate national legislation in the name of federalism
remains the most persuasive: Congress periodically needs to be
reminded that its powers are indeed limited to those enumerated in
the Constitution.3 The Congress that would hear the reminder,
however, was very different from the one that enacted the GunFree School Zones Act. The Contract With America showed that
Republicans were already sensitive to the question of the relative
role of nation and4 states. Why then should the justices have invalidated the statute?

Perhaps they saw the elections in a different way.5 The 1994
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. I would like to thank the commentators at the Case Western Reserve Symposium,
Bruce Ackerman, Vicki Jackson, Timothy Lynch, and Frank Michelman for their comments on this essay, and Larry Kramer for his comments on some of the ideas that went
into it.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. Lopez was argued on Election Day, November 8, 1994. Ordinarily the justices
discuss the cases they have heard early in the week on Wednesday afternoon. DAVID
O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN PoLmcs 293 (3d. ed.
1993).
3. PHILIP BOBBITT,

CONSTITUTIONAL

FATE:

THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION

192

(1982).
4. Frank Michelman suggests that the Court might have invalidated the statute to
remind itself that it remembers that the national government is one of enumerated powers.
5. It should be obvious that I do not mean to impute particular thoughts and inten-
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elections, they might have thought, were the culmination of a long
campaign of public education and reflection on constitutional fundamentals. For decades, Republican constitutional theorists had
been revisiting the New Deal's constitutional settlement. The Reagan Administration attempted to implement some aspects of a new
settlement, but it had been thwarted by Democratic control of the
House of Representatives. The 1994 elections provided the opportunity to complete the Reagan Revolution. They were, that is, a
constitutional moment of the sort Bruce Ackerman has written
6
about.
I do not mean to assert that the 1994 elections and Lopez
really were a constitutional moment,7 or that the justices themselves saw the elections in the way I have suggested. Instead, I
want to use Lopez and the 1994 elections as a vehicle for exploring some aspects of Ackerman's intriguing theory. In particular, I
want to examine the two central metaphors in Ackerman's analysis.
The first is that of the constitutional moment itself, expressing the
distinction between times of deep public reflection on constitutional
fundamentals and times of ordinary politics. The second is the
metaphor in which the Court's role is to construct a constitutional
vision that unites the choices made during each constitutional moment.

tions to the justices who met on November 9 to discuss Lopez- my formulations are
simply an expository device to open up some important questions of constitutional theory.
6. BRUCE ACKER AN, WE Tim PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONs 266 (1991).
7. The question mark in the title of this Article conveys a substantive point. As the
other articles in the Symposium indicate, a substantial case can be made that Lopez need
not have a significant impact on the overall structure of national legislative power. I think
speculation about the possible broader meaning of Lopez remains valuable. One decision,
to be sure, need not mean much, but a single swallow can herald the coming of spring.
Or, as Justice Souter put it, "[n]ot every epochal case has come in epochal trappings."
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657.
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PROBLEMS OF ITERPRETIVE FORMALISM

Introduction:Ackerman's Scheme and the Present Moment

I acknowledge at the outset that we cannot be in a constitutional moment in Ackerman's terms.' For Ackerman, the higher
law-making process has several stages. First comes a "signaling
phase," when a revisionist movement "earns the constitutional
authority to claim that... its reform agenda should be placed at
the center of sustained public scrutiny."9 Next comes the stage of
"proposal," when the movement offers "a series of more or less
operational proposals for constitutional reform."'" Then comes
"mobilized popular deliberation," when the proposals "are tested
time and again within the higher lawmaking system."" Finally,
there is a stage of "legal codification," when the courts integrate
the proposals into the overall body of constitutional law. 2
To Ackerman, higher law-making comes in two variants. He
calls the formal amendment process the "classical system" of higher law-making. 3 Congress signals the need for constitutional
change by proposing amendments, and the People accept the
changes through the supermajoritarian ratification process.
Ackerman also describes a "modem system" of higher law-making,
based on the New Deal model. 4 Here, "the decisive constitutional
signal is issued by a President claiming a mandate from the People. If Congress supports this claim by enacting transformative
statutes that challenge the fundamentals of the preexisting regime,
these statutes are treated as the functional equivalent of a proposal
for constitutional amendment."'" The stage of mobilized deliberation occurs after "the Supreme Court invalidates the initial wave of
transformative statutes and challenges the ascendant movement to
8. This seems an appropriate point to note the standard observation about Ackerman's
approach, that it is a work-in-progress, of which the first of three promised volumes has
appeared. See, e.g., William T. Fisher II, The Defects of Dualism, 59 U. Cu. L. REv.
955, 955 (1992) (book review) ("Because the project is not yet complete, it would be
premature to venture a comprehensive evaluation of Ackerman's argument."). Later volumes may qualify the theory or address points made by Ackerman's critics.
9. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 266.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id. at 267.
13. Id.

14. Id. at 268.
15. Id.
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refine its vision and go to 6the People for another show of deep
and broad popular support."'
Which aspects of Ackerman's description of the modem process are essential to his theory? There seems to be no reason to
insist that signals or proposals emanate solely from the President.' Consider the present situation. The Republican party's reconstruction during the Reagan Administration almost certainly
should count as the signal Ackerman requires. And the Contract
With America seems to satisfy Ackerman's requirement of concrete
proposals that challenge the fundamentals of the existing regime.
What may be lacking, however, is the stage of "mobilized popular
deliberation."
At that stage, Ackerman requires a reasonably well-focused
public debate over the proposed transformation. The Supreme
Court's resistance plays a key role in Ackerman's version of the
modem system, because it provides the opportunity for what
Ackerman elsewhere calls a "triggering election" in which the
People deliberately consider whether to accept the constitutional
transformation the President and Congress have proposed. But,
presumably, resistance by the President to the proposals might
provide the opportunity for a triggering election, this time in 1996.
Further, Ackerman has recently suggested that mobilized popular
deliberation can manifest itself in a triggering election even if no
national institution has resisted the proposed constitutional transformation.' Still, something like a triggering election is essential in
Ackerman's scheme so that we can distinguish truly transformative
moments from political change within a preexisting and
preservationist framework. We cannot allow politicians to "assert
that a normal electoral victory has given them a mandate to enact
an ordinary statute that overturns the considered judgments previously reached by the People."'2
Within this scheme, the present situation cannot be a constitutional moment." The 1994 elections may have moved the nation
16. Id.
17. See id. at 81-83 (ambiguously describing the Reconstruction Congress and President
Andrew Johnson as initiators of constitutional change after the Civil War).
18. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REv.
799, 875 (1995).
19. See id. (referring to a "Constitutional Solution by the Unanimous Consent of Senate, House, and President"). The mobilization at issue occurred during war, which may be
important in identifying when consensual transformations occur.
20. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 6.
21. Ackerman prefers to say only that a constitutional solution has not yet been arrived
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through the proposal stage, but cannot be treated as the "triggering
election" because public attention was insufficiently focused on the
proposed constitutional transformation. In particular, the public
could not know whether the Contract With America was mere
campaign rhetoric-a standard campaign platform common to times
of normal politics-or a serious transformational agenda. One side
in the constitutional debate may have engaged in mobilized deliberation, but not the People as a whole.
Have events since the elections clarified the state of affairs?
The Contract With America, and the Reagan Revolution more
generally, can be broadly divided into two parts. The first part
consisted of proposals for substantial structural change in the national government: restrictions on unfunded federal mandates, a
constitutional amendment to balance the budget, and term limits for
members of Congress. The first has been enacted.' The balanced
budget amendment and term limits were rejected.' Congress and
the President, however, are on a course to balance the budget
within a decade.24 In Ackerman's scheme, such statutory developments can be part of a constitutional transformation. Finally, the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, barring salary increases for national
legislators from taking effect until after an intervening election,
expresses a structural concern about the degree to which members
of Congress act as the peoples' representatives or on their own
behalfLas
The Contract With America's second part was a series of

at. I use the term moment primarily because it is the one most commonly used in discussing Ackerman's theory, and does not in this context seriously mislead.
22. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub L. No. 104-4 (1995).
23. On March 29, 1995, the House of Representatives failed to approve a term limits
amendment by the required two-thirds majority. Vote Profile Report on House Joint Resolution 73, available in LEXIS, Legis library, Cngres file. The Senate failed to approve a
balanced budget amendment by the required majority on March 1, 1995. Vote Profile
Report on House Joint Resolution 1, available in LEXIS, Legis library, Cngres file.
24. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Clinton, GOP End Federal Shutdown; Both Sides
Pledge Effort to Balance Budget in 7 Years, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), November 20,
1995, at IA.
25. The Amendment was declared in force in 1992, after a ratification process that
began in 1789. This anomaly intriguingly connects the present to prior constitutional moments, because of Ackerman's stress on the irregularities in the process by which the
Constitution and the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted. ACKERMAN, supra note 6,
at 41-42 (noting that in a sense "our very identification of the Founding as a Founding
presupposes that the Philadelphia Convention acted without legal warrant"); id. at 44-45
(observing that "[t]he Reconstruction Amendments . . . would never have been ratified if
the Republicans had followed the rules laid down by Article Five").
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proposals aimed at reducing the national government's scope. Here
too, the balanced budget proposal played a key role, because substantial reductions in federal non-defense expenditures were required to achieve a balanced budget. Proposals for regulatory reform and transformation of public assistance programs were similarly designed to shift regulatory authority from the nation to the
states or, as with changes in the tort system, to individual contracting parties.
We can understand Lopez as one item in the transformation
process. Without a Supreme Court decision limiting the scope of
the national government, the Contract With America might only
represent a policy decision to reduce that government, and not a
structural conclusion that the national government lacks the constitutional competence to continue to do what it had been doing.
Ackerman says that the modem process of higher law-making
requires the Supreme Court to resist transformative proposals:'
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton27 might be an example. Rejecting in
strong and well-considered dictum the possibility that Congress
could enact term limits by a transformative statute, 8 the Court
forced Congress to use only the classical system of higher lawmaking, which has so far proved inadequate. Within this framework, we might think Lopez was wrongly decided, at least in the
descriptive sense that the Court failed to provide an occasion for a
mobilized public to endorse a reduction in the national
government's scope.
As Ackerman's more recent work suggests, however, the Supreme Court's role in the modem system of higher law-making
need not be to resist transformative proposals and thereby allow a
triggering election to occur. That description draws too narrowly on
the precise circumstances of the New Deal transformation. Even
within Ackerman's initial framework, there need only be some
national institution that resists transformative change. It could be
the Supreme Court, but it could also be the presidency. The Court
therefore can ally itself with proponents of transformative change.
Lopez would then be entirely consistent with the proposition that

26. Id. at 268 (noting that in the phase of "mobilized deliberation," "the Supreme
Court invalidates the initial wave of transformative statutes and challenges the ascendant
movement to refine its vision and go to the People for another show of deep and popular
support").
27. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
28. See id. at 1847-52.

1996]

LIVING IN A CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT?

851

we are experiencing a constitutional moment. Further, Ackerman
has now suggested that transformations can be consensual, in
which case the Court can straightforwardly endorse ongoing transformations.29 In either event, Lopez can be rationalized as the
Court's way of participating in a reduction in the national
government's scope.
Congress has not yet enacted, and the President has not yet
signed, substantial aspects of either part of the Contract With
America. At the same time, however, substantial reductions in nondefense expenditures are sure to be adopted. Something, in short, is
happening.
Without resistance from some national institution that helps
focus public attention on the proposed constitutional transformation,
without the consensual adoption of transformative statutes, and
without a triggering election that might be taken to endorse the
proposed transformation, we cannot yet say that a constitutional
moment has occurred." Still, the present situation provides a useful occasion on which to examine Ackerman's theory. In particular,
we can explore the formalist elements-the requirement of a triggering election, for example-in that theory. Constitutional transformation occurs when the People engage in the higher law-making
process. In that process, the People take proposals "with a seriousness they do not normally accord to politics"'" and discuss them
' so that people "will
"time and again, in . . . deliberative fora"32
recognize that our so-called representatives are up to something
special ... : a self-conscious challenge to our fundamental law."33
Yet, although constitutional moments may occur, they may not
be the only times when constitutional transformation occurs. As
Larry Kramer has pointed out, the nation's constitutional values
develop over time, with individual proposals met with
counterarguments, deliberation in various public fora, and resolu-

29. Michael Klarman denies that transformations can be consensual. Michael KIarman,
Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of
Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REv. 759, 774 (1992) (review essay). For similar
criticisms, see Robert J. Lipkin, Can American Constitutional Law Be Postmodern?, 42
BUFF. L. REv. 317, 363-67 (1994). That may be a plausible reading of We the People,
but Ackerman's more recent work does allow for consensual transformations.
30. Perhaps the Democratic Congress's resistance to the Reagan Revolution should be
sufficient. If so, we are indeed experiencing the late stages of a constitutional moment.
31. AcKERMAN, supra note 6, at 6.
32. ld.
33. Id.at 285.
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tions that get embedded in our constitutional sensibility. The pace
of this development varies from issue to issue. As Michael
Klarman suggests, for example, "[t]he gradual accretion of power
in the presidency" resulted not from a "single dramatic transformation, but rather [from] a gradual drift. '3 4 More broadly, constitutional transformations occur "as points along a continuum,"3
sometimes arising from sharp and dramatic confrontations, but
sometimes resulting from long-term shifts in public preferences.
Regime shifts of the sort Ackerman describes may occur when a
fairly large number of issues come together for resolution more or
less simultaneously, and then we may experience constitutional moments. But, Kramer suggests, Ackerman has provided no strong
reason to think that the only times when constitutional innovations
occur is during such moments. Why should we insist on the formality of a triggering election and, if necessary, resistance that
produces such an election? Why is not a judgment that sufficient
deliberation has occurred enough?
B.

The Interpretive Nature of Ackerman's Theory

The answers to those questions, if there are any, lie in the
interpretive nature of Ackerman's theory.36 I wish to contrast an
interpretive theory to a normative one, for one can easily reject
Ackerman's theory if it were a normative theory. Ackerman distinguishes between the daily decisions made in "normal lawmaking,"
when ordinary interest-group politics holds sway, and higher lawmaking, which involves extraordinary deliberation and "a broad
view of the public interest."37
A normative theory would assert that decisions taken during
constitutional moments were better than decisions taken during
normal lawmaking.38 The ground for such an assertion would presumably be that representatives embedded in their daily life in
34. Klarman, supra note 29, at 791. For additional discussion of Klarman's point, see
infra text accompanying note 138.
35. Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We the People,
9 CONST. COMMENTARY 309, 324 (1992) (review essay).
36. For the most extensive discussion of which I am aware that treats Ackerman's
work as interpretive, see Lipkin, supra note 29, at 346-76. Lipkin describes Ackerman's
theory as "an intriguing interpretive history of constitutional change." Id. at 346.
37. AcKERMAN, supra note 6, at 6.
38. Miriam Galston and William A. Galston attribute this normative claim to
Ackerman, in my view mistakenly. Miriam Galston & William A. Galston, Reason, Consent, and the U.S. Constitution: Bruce Ackerman's We the People, 104 ETHICS 446, 452
(1994).
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politics and responding to interest-group pressures are less likely to
develop sound public policy than the People who, deliberating
seriously about fundamental questions, manage to extract themselves from their immediate circumstances to design institutions for
the longer run. But, to be blunt, there is simply no good reason to
accept that assertion or its supporting ground.39
Why might representatives' decisions during ordinary politics
be better than the People's during constitutional moments?" Representatives in ordinary politics are deeply embedded in the realities of public life. Interest groups may make them acutely aware of
the impact their proposals will have on the daily lives of their
constituents. They are in a position to make intensely practical
judgments about the likely outcomes that fundamental institutional
innovations will produce. And, as Frederick Schauer points out,
representatives acting behind closed doors, as they characteristically
do in ordinary politics, might offer "some resistance to the demagoguery that might play better on the public podium."'" In contrast, the People during constitutional moments make disembodied
judgments, standing apart from themselves and from those who
will be affected by innovations. Making decisions in the abstract,
they may misestimate the costs and benefits of the innovations, or
the distribution of their effects.42
I do not mean to claim that the judgments made by representatives in ordinary politics are necessarily better than those made
by the People in constitutional moments. Of course, judgments in
ordinary politics can be distorted when interest group pressures are
themselves distorting, for the standard reasons offered by public
choice theorists.43 Policy-making by anecdote may be defective,
39. For a short statement of the difficulty, see Klarman, supra note 29, at 765.
40. Note that what appears at first to be one distinction is actually two: between periods of ordinary politics and moments of high deliberation, and between representatives
and the People. Don Herzog describes three distinctions embedded in Ackerman's scheme:
between representatives and the People, between reflective and unreflective politics, and
between "the pluralist pursuit of group interest" and "principle and the common good."
Don Herzog, Democratic Credentials, 104 Emcs 467, 471 (1994). As Herzog says, the
connection among these distinctions is "utterly contingent." Id. I take Ackerman to be
arguing, however, for a constructive interpretation of U.S. constitutional history according
to which the distinctions converge rather than diverge.
41. Frederick Schauer, Deliberating About Deliberation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1187, 1200
(1992) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991)).
42. See Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule
of Law, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 689, 706 (1995) (questioning why "Peter sober should be
preferred to Peter drunk, or put differently, why a constitution is not Peter drunk and the

electorate Peter sober").
43. For Ackerman's discussion of these distortions, see Bruce Ackerman, Beyond
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for the standard reasons offered by cognitive psychologists who
point out that people systematically overestimate the significance of
dramatic events.' And judgments made during constitutional moments can eliminate the distortions produced by a person's selfinterested judgments about how new policies will affect him or her
personally in the short run.
The judgments made by representatives during periods of
ordinary politics and by the People during constitutional moments
are, in short, simply different judgments. They implicate different
characteristics of situations of choice, but each characteristic is
relevant to sound decision-making. 5
Responding to critics who mistakenly asserted that he was
offering a normative theory, Ackerman pointed out that he was in
fact offering an interpretive one.' His claim is that his theory
provides an account of the way the people of the United States
actually understand their constitutional tradition, and for that reason
alone, provides a normative basis for accepting the decisions the
People make during constitutional moments. So, for example, we
actually believe that the New Deal transformed our fundamental
constitutional system even though the formal criteria for constitutional amendment were not satisfied.
We must distinguish this sort of interpretive claim from a
different one that many of Ackerman's critics have attributed to
him. Suzanna Sherry and Michael Klarman argue that Ackerman's
claim is originalist, and fails to persuade as originalism.47

Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985).
44. See Aaron Tversky & Donald Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127-28 (1974) (describing the "availability" heuristic,
which leads people to weigh vivid, readily available information more heavily than general
information).
45. The convenient escape hatch would allocate the characteristics making embedded
judgments important to ordinary politics and the others to constitutional moments. I suppose the argument would be that decisions made during periods of ordinary politics deal
with more short-term arrangements, as to which embedded judgments would be more
important, while decisions made during constitutional moments deal with long-term, constitutional arrangements, as to which more abstract judgments would be more important. I
have been unable to think of good reasons why this should be so. The high-toned citation
for this proposition is THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986).
46. Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 517 (1994).
47. See Klarman, supra note 29, at 777-84; Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism
Past, 105 HARv. L. REv. 918, 924-27 (1992) (book review); see also Fisher, supra note
8, at 966 n.21 (suggesting an interpretive reading of Ackerman after criticizing Ackerman
as originalist). Lipkin also criticizes Ackerman as an originalist, notwithstanding Lipkin's
more general understanding of Ackerman's interpretive approach. Lipkin, supra note 29, at
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Originalism claims that a decision made in the past gains normative force from the very fact that someone-the Founders, the
Reconstruction Amendments' ratifiers-made it. In contrast, someone who offers an interpretive claim urges that the claim offers a
plausible and normatively attractive narrative that connects the past
to the present. As Robert Justin Lipkin puts it, "[a]n interpretive
history which accurately depicts our constitutional universe, absent
normative reasons against it, is normatively valuable just because it
describes and explains our practice."' Such a history overcomes
the normative difficulty associated with explaining why we today
should be bound by decisions made by people long ago, its proponent claims, by demonstrating how we today are in some important-though constructed-sense the very People who made those
decisions.49 In Ackerman's words, "the narrative we tell ourselves
about our Constitution's roots is a deeply significant act of collective self-definition; its continual re-telling plays a critical role in
the ongoing construction of national identity."5 And, because national identity-or at least some supra-individual identity-is normatively valuable, interpretive narratives that create communities
(beyond face-to-face exchanges) have normative weight. 5'
Ackerman's interpretive narrative may be overly celebratory.52
A criticism offered by Don Herzog is suggestive: according to
Herzog, Ackerman's narrative fails "to explain the possibility of a
binding unity in the face of deep cleavages over race, class, gen'
der, and more."53
For Herzog, this undermines the validity of
Ackerman's project.54 In contrast, I suggest, it simply opens for

367-68 n.157.
48. Lipkin, supra note 29, at 375.
49. The usual citation for the constructed nature of national identity is BENEDicr ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNrrmS: REFLEc IONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1991).
50. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 36.
51. Using constitutional law as one vehicle for the construction of a national identity
may be defended on the ground that a supra-individual identity is a basic human good
and that constitutional law is one important domain for the development and protection of
basic human goods.
52. For myself, I would not place as much weight on the normative value of national
identity as Ackerman does. I agree with him, however, on the proposition that some
narrative connecting each individual to some broader, though imagined, community is
essential to the coherence of the self.
53. Herzog, supra note 40, at 475.
54. Ackerman hints that a principle of "charity in interpretation" justifies the version
he presents. Ackerman, supra note 46, at 521. I agree with Herzog, however, that
Ackerman's account, both in We the People and in the closing pages of Rooted Cosmo-
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consideration the possibility that a more subtle narrative of national
identity would be more inspiring and attractive precisely because it
acknowledged the deep cleavages in our history."
Understood in this way, Ackerman offers readers a construction of constitutional history that, he hopes, will be adopted because it supports or generates a normatively attractive vision of our
national identity. 6 In this he differs from originalists, who hope
that their accounts will be adopted because they are accurate representations of historical events or understandings. Why, though, is
the narrative Ackerman offers normatively attractive? Ackerman's
argument on this point is either weak or unfortunately truncated.
Ackerman argues that his construction makes sense of the real
practices of constitutionalism in the United States, and does so
better than alternative constructions. In Ronald Dworkin's terms, it
"fits" our experience better than alternatives. 7 Further, it opens up
the possibility of revising-reconstructing-our national self-understanding in ways that can be defended on independent normative
grounds. A purely backward-looking originalism licenses such
revisions, but only at the expense of treating them as arbitrary
innovations rather than as part of the organic development of our
national self-identity.5"

politanism, comes close to a "debased or vulgar" patriotism. See Herzog, supra note 40,
at 479.
55. My personal hobby-horse on this point is what I take from the work of Eugene
Genovese and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, that the cleavages of race and gender in the antebellum South simultaneously bound whites and African-Americans, and men and women,
together:. White (and male) culture has been shaped by African-American (and female)
culture, and vice versa, in ways that make it misleading to speak of white or male culture at all. See E. Fox-GENOVESE & E. GENOVESE, FRUITS OF MERCHANT CAPITAL:
SLAVERY AND BOURGEOIS PROPERTY IN THE RISE AND EXPANSION OF CAPITAuSM 197-98
(1983).
56. In consequence, the narrative inevitably offers a unified, and therefore relatively
conflict-free, construction of "our" national identity, to ensure that there is a historically
continuous People of whom we today are part. For a criticism of Ackerman's conflict-free
vision, see Fisher, supra note 8, at 972-74 (arguing that Americans differ greatly as between members of different cultures.)
57. This is not to say that it is a precisely accurate account of our constitutional experience. No single-element construction like Ackerman's could possibly be accurate. But,
Ackerman claims, it fits our experience better than its chief competitors, rightsfoundationalism and democratic monism.
58. For this reason, Klarman errs in describing Ackerman's proposal to entrench fundamental rights in the Constitution as a "glaring" contradiction of his overall approach. See
Klarman, supra note 29, at 763-64 n.37. As I understand his argument, Ackerman believes that his proposal is plausible precisely because it is consistent with the narrative of
national identity he offers his readers. In addition, though Ackerman believes that rights-
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I have no quarrel with Ackerman's claim in the form I gave
earlier, that his theory provides an account of how we understand
our constitutional tradition. Certainly the distinction between ordinary politics and constitutional moments is so much a part of our
understanding that a scholar can write, "[a] constitution is Peter
sober while the electorate is Peter drunk,"' almost off-handedly,
correctly assuming that readers will understand the point.
The difficulty, however, is that Ackerman's own exposition
makes it clear that there are alternative interpretive accounts of our
constitutional tradition. One set of criticisms of Ackerman's account offers variants of the claim that it improperly discounts the
importance of what he calls rights-foundationalism as an interpretive rather than a normative account of U.S. constitutionalism.'
Similarly, the tradition Ackerman calls monism, placing heavy
though not conclusive normative weight on the judgments made by
perhaps transitory democratic majorities, is plainly an important
strand in U.S. constitutionalism. Yet problems arise for Ackerman's
overall theory if dualism, the theory of constitutional moments, is
only one of several elements in an interpretive account of our
constitutionalism.6 '

foundationalism is not currently available to the American People, and is therefore an
inappropriate basis for contemporary constitutional decision-making, I take his suggesting a
constitutional amendment as indicating how the People can transform our constitutional
identity. For a suggestion supporting this analysis, see Frank Michelman, Always Under
Law?, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 227, 243-45 (1995), which notes that a hypothetical
amendment "would plainly be meant as an alteration in the country's concretely operative
scheme of higher law."
59. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 196 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstaad eds., 1988).
Holmes attributes the concept and the phrase to Hayek. We are both convinced, however,
that it goes farther back. Frank Michelman gives a variant attributed to Francis Bacon.
Frank Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 61 n.320
(1986).
60. See, e.g., Galston & Galston, supra note 38, at 455-57; Schauer, supra note 41, at
1189-91. Ackerman's response to his critics takes them to be asserting that rightsfoundationalism is the best normative justification for constitutionalism. Ackerman, supra
note 46, at 517. He may be correct in his reading of his critics, but at least some can
also be taken to be making an interpretive claim. See, e.g., James Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 355, 364 (1994) (arguing that "the
idea of inalienable rights is far more congenial to the American constitutional tradition
than to the German" (emphasis added)).
61. Ackerman's dualism incorporates both rights-foundationalism and monism, but in
the process comes close to eliminating them as vibrant elements in an interpretive narrative of constitutionalism. I take his critics' point to be that his dualism transcends rightsfoundationalism at excessive cost.
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C. The Tension Between Ackerman's Interpretivism and
Ackerman's Formalism
The problems arise because a multi-element interpretivism sits
uncomfortably with Ackerman's schema of signaling-proposal-deliberation-codification, which injects formalism into the account.62
Indeed, we can see the tension with Ackerman's formalism in
several ways.
Perhaps the most obvious derives from the very fact that
Ackerman would have us identify constitutional moments. These
are times when the People, either directly or through their representatives, mount "a self-conscious challenge to our fundamental
law"'63 and consider the challenge "with a seriousness that they do
not normally accord to politics."' Why interpose the formalist
schema of signaling-proposal-deliberation-codification here?' Why
not simply and directly examine whether some events did indeed
involve the appropriate challenge and seriousness of deliberation?'
This would accommodate Kramer's concerns as well,67 allowing
us to identify discrete constitutional transformations even if they
are not part of an overall regime change.
Ackerman's critics have pointed out another difficulty arising
from his formalism, and examining it may help explain why concerns like Kramer's may not squarely address Ackerman's position.
62. Cass Sunstein uses the term "formalism" to describe a somewhat different aspect of
Ackerman's account. Focusing on Ackerman's argument that constitutional interpretation
requires a synthesis of the substantive decisions made during each constitutional moment
(which I discuss below, see infra text accompanying notes 82-90), Sunstein points out that
"any particular view about the right synthesis will have to partake of the judgments of
the synthesizer." CASS StUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONsnTuriON 370 n.21 (1993). Asserting
that this "is hardly a decisive objection," Sunstein says that Ackerman's account "thus
far" does not address the "nonhistorical dimension" of "the task of interpretation." Id.
63. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 285.
64. Id. at 6.
65. Some of Ackerman's critics have been misled, albeit understandably, by a further
formalist specification that comes in Ackerman's description of the New Deal constitutional moment. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 29, at 768. Klarman argues that "Ackerman
fails to abide by his own criteria" in discussing "the existence of other, 'lesser' constitutional moments." Id. at 769. Yet, in discussing those other moments, Ackerman applies
his basic formalist criteria, not the more specific versions he locates in the New Deal
moment.
66. Such a direct judgment need not be unguided. The person making the judgment
would rely on evidence of popular activity, and such evidence might well include items
in Ackerman's formalist list, but the person making the judgment could conclude that a
constitutional moment had occurred even if not a single one of Ackerman's elements had
occurred.
67. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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Ackerman's formalism leads him into the characteristic difficulties
of any formalism. Ackerman's schema is both over- and underinclusive with respect to the underlying account of dualist democracy. 61 Michael McConnell argues that the repudiation of Reconstruction in 1876 satisfies Ackerman's formal criteria for identifying a constitutional moment, yet Ackerman does not treat it as a
constitutional moment.69 I have suggested, more briefly, that postWatergate political reforms might also reflect the kind of public
deliberation that characterizes constitutional moments even though
Ackerman's formal criteria had not been satisfied in the 1970s."
The particular examples are unimportant, however. The basic point
is that formal criteria by definition cannot precisely identify all and
only constitutional moments.
The difficulty is compounded if the U.S. constitutional tradition is pluralist. Because we regard ourselves as rightsfoundationalists, Ackerman's critics are troubled by his assertion
that we could amend the Constitution to eliminate its fundamental
human rights guarantees because Article V contains no significant
substantive limitations on permissible constitutional amendments.7'
To pursue an example Ackerman offers,72 imagine a structural
constitutional amendment establishing Christianity as the American
state religion, adopted by statute after the formal processes of
signaling, proposal, and deliberation. Suppose as well that a case
challenging the statute's constitutionality comes before a judge who
fully accepts Ackerman's account of a dualist tradition in U.S.
constitutionalism that is independent of our rights-foundationalist
tradition. It is not hard to imagine that judge invalidating the statute, relying on the rights-foundationalist tradition. This example
involves a decision-maker invoking one strand of our traditions
against another: The judge exercises her judgment to choose among
the strands.

68. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 29, at 770 (discussing over-inclusiveness); Schauer,
supra note 41, at 1194 (citing examples of Ackerman's under-inclusiveness).
69. See Michael McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 115 (1994). For reasons discussed below, he would have difficulty doing so.
See infra text accompanying note 105.
70. MARK TuSHNET, RED, WHrrE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 286-87 (1988).
71. AcKERMAN, supra note 6, at 320-21. For criticisms, see Fleming, supra note 60, at
369-78.
72. ACKERmAN, supra note 6, at 14-16. Ackerman uses the example of a real, textual
constitutional amendment adopted through the classical system.
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Ackerman might reject this form of judgment by defending his
interpretation of U.S. constitutionalism as better than a pluralist
account. I doubt that this position could be sustained as an interpretive matter. In light of the strong elements of rightsfoundationalism and democratic monism in our tradition, rejecting
pluralism on interpretive grounds would not be a better interpretation of the U.S. constitutional tradition than pluralism.
Ackerman's single-element interpretation might be better according to some normative theory because it might transcend, while
it incorporates, the elements of a pluralist theory. It might offer a
better fit with our tradition than a pluralist interpretation, where the
criterion for determining goodness of fit is normative rather than
interpretive. As Cass Sunstein has suggested, however, Ackerman's
work to this point does not identify this normative criterion.73
The more general problem of formalism's under- and overinclusiveness also implicates questions of judgment, and Ackerman
sketchily suggests his intention to invoke the standard defense of
formalism against this problem. Instead of relying on Ackerman's
formal criteria, why should not a decision-maker ask directly
whether the People have acted in an appropriately serious way? To
quote the key passage again, Ackerman writes that "the dualist
Constitution prevents elected politicians from exaggerating their
authority. They are not to assert that a normal electoral victory has
given them a mandate to enact an ordinary statute that overturns
the considered judgments previously reached by the People."74 If
politicians are authorized to make the direct judgment that the
People have acted in a constitutional moment, they will err too
frequently. In particular, they will claim that a constitutional moment has occurred when it actually has not.
Ackerman's formal criteria will bar politicians from making
these erroneous claims. Because the formal criteria are under-inclusive, they will also bar them from making correct claims of serious
popular deliberation and the like, when such deliberation has occurred even though the formal criteria have not been satisfied."

73. SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 370 n. 21.

74. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 6.
75. The problem of over-inclusiveness is less serious. Satisfying the formal criteria
sometimes allows politicians to assert that a constitutional moment has occurred when in
fact it has not. But, on Ackerman's account, politicians are likely to make such assertions
anyway. The only cost of the formalist criteria might be to lend legitimacy to those assertions.
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Ackerman's formalism is defensible if it rules out more erroneous
than correct claims that a constitutional moment has occurred. I
wonder whether it does. The difficulty, I believe, is that

Ackerman's formal criteria may not be formal enough.' As he
writes, "[a]ssessing such matters does not, of course, allow for
sharp yes/no answers." He sometimes provides additional, even
more formal criteria.78
Note finally that Ackerman's formalism is aimed at restraining
the rhetoric of politicians. He suggests plausibly that they have
incentives to over-claim that constitutional moments have occurred:

As he points out, politicians too frequently claim they have a
"mandate" from "the People" for their ordinary legislative programs.

79

Consider, however, the present situation, suggested by Lopez.
Ackerman's formal criteria for constitutional moments have not yet
been satisfied. Imagine a judge who accepts Ackerman's theory and
who makes a direct judgment that a constitutional moment has
indeed occurred. Should that judge act on her judgment, or should
she wait for the triggering election and the like? Unless the judge's

direct judgment is likely to be distorted-presumably for reasons
different from the ones that account for the distortions of
politicians' judgments-I see no reason in Ackerman's account to

bar a judge from making a direct judgment rather than relying on

76. Another common criticism of Ackerman's criteria is that they do not really help
identify a limited set of constitutional moments. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 69, at
142-43. To the extent that this criticism is accurate, it shows that the formalist criteria
Ackerman offers do not do the job they should, but it does not impugn the more fundamental argument for some formalist criteria.
77. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 272.
78. See, e.g., id. at 274-75 ("[A] dualist Constitution should demand that a movement
have the deep support of 20 percent of the citizenry, and the additional support of 31
percent of private citizens, before it may place its initiative on the higher lawmaking
agenda."). To the extent that his schema still requires an intervening triggering election,
that is another more formal criterion. See also Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1172-73 (1988) (arguing that "transformative nominations
have been seriously considered only after a President has won decisive reelection on the
basis of a political program advocating fundamental change in reigning constitutional prin-

ciple').
79. For an examination of the history of one version of this rhetoric, see Richard J.
Ellis & Stephen Kirk, Presidential Mandates in the Nineteenth Century: Conceptual
Change and Institutional Development, 9 STuDIES AM. POL. DEVELOPMENT 117 (1995),
which explains the history and institutionalization of the mandate concept See also Robert
A Dahli, Myth of the Presidential Mandate, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 355, 370 (1990) (suggesting
that the myth of the presidental mandate contributes to the "pseudodemocratization of the
presidency" (emphasis omitted)).
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Ackerman's formal criteria. s
In sum, Ackerman's formalism may be justified in the way all
formalism probably must be, by identifying the characteristic institutional flaws of different decision-makers to determine whether, all
things considered, outcomes will be better justified if they make a
direct judgment or if they are confined by formalist criteria. With
reference to Lopez in particular, it appears that a justice who found
the 1994 elections and the Contract With America good evidence
that the People had indeed deliberated seriously about fundamental
institutional change could rely on that judgment in deciding
Lopez.8
II.

PROBLEMS OF CHARACTERIZATION

According to Ackerman, the Supreme Court must resolve "The
Problem of Synthesis."8 Each constitutional moment transforms
our constitutional culture, yet the Court must "synthesize the great
contributions" of each moment." The judges, he writes, sit "in the
caboose" of a railroad train, "looking backward." 4 They must
describe what they see "in a comprehensive way."" For example,
the problem after the New Deal was two-fold: "How to reconcile
the Founders' affirmation of limited national government with the
New Deal's legitimation of ongoing bureaucratic intervention in
economic and social life? .

.

. How does the affirmation of activist

government in the twentieth century require a reinterpretation of

80. Ackerman expresses some nervousness about "rely[ing] so heavily on judges" in
"the informality" of the modem system of constitutional transformation. ACKERMAN, supra
note 6, at 284. He does not, however, explain why judges are likely to err in their judgments, and points out that "even the classical system relies heavily on the courts" to
interpret the verbal "formulae" embedded in the Constitution. Id. I would make the same
point about Schauer's argument that formal criteria are needed to avoid the possibility that
"courts would see themselves as constrained only by the operation of an external political
process, doing whatever they could get away with." Schauer, supra note 41, at 1195.
81. As Ackerman has suggested in conversation, it may be important to distinguish between a constitutional moment and a constitutional solution. This distinction suggests that
it would be wrong for a judge to decide Lopez on the ground that by 1994, the People
had already arrived at a constitutional solution and had inaugurated a new constitutional
regime. But, because courts can participate in constitutional transformations when some
other institution provides the resistance that triggers popular mobilization, a judge could
properly conclude that we are now in a constitutional moment, when the constitutional
solution remains unknown.
82. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 86.
83. Id. at 89.
84. Id. at 98.
85. Id. at 99.
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6
the meaning of Republican Reconstruction?,1
As Ackerman's formulation suggests, the problem of characterization has two parts. Judges must understand the most recent
constitutional moment, and they must describe the prior ones in
ways that allow them to synthesize all the constitutional moments
in a unified, comprehensive narrative of U.S. constitutionalism. The
problem of characterization necessarily entails judgment: just as
Ackerman himself offers an interpretive history of U.S.
constitutionalism, so in characterizing prior constitutional moments
judges offer their interpretive accounts.87
At this point, Ackerman offers another reason for us to reject
the proposition on which my discussion depends, that his theory
can illuminate contemporary constitutional issues. Lopez, the 1994
elections, and the Contract With America indicate that we might be
in a new constitutional moment. But, Ackerman argues, during and
shortly after a constitutional moment, courts can do no more than
provide what he calls particularistic syntheses of the present and
the past.88 They will see recent events as "the culmination of
something concrete and particular."89 As those events recede into
memory, the details of the particular struggles that became crystallized in the constitutional moment fade, thereby enabling judges to
provide the appropriate comprehensive synthesis.'
I have already suggested that Ackerman's skepticism may well
be appropriate, by offering alternative middle-level characterizations
of the present considered as a constitutional moment. If a new
constitutional regime emerges in the next decade, perhaps after a
triggering election, will it differ from the present one in the
government's scope or in its structure?

86. Id. at 141.
87. See Ackerman, supra note 46, at 528-29 ("By re-presenting the constitutional
meanings of the past, and giving them modem significance in concrete cases, the courts
hold up a mirror to the present generation . . . . By focusing attention on a reflective
understanding of the past, the Court encourages a more reflective stance from present-day
constitutional movements.'); cf Lipkin, supra note 29, at 354 n.112 ("To interpret the
past, one must interpret it terms of the present and the future.").
88. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 97.
89. Id.
90. I doubt that Lopez can be understood as an ordinary revision of the post-New Deal
synthesis, resulting from the fact that newer Justices see the New Deal receding even
farther into the distance. Such an account of Lopez would leave unexplained why a revision of the synthesis is appropriate, or what its content ought to be.
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Recharacterizing the New Deal

The immediate reaction to Lopez and other cases in the 1994
Term was that they foreshadowed a repudiation of the New Deal
constitutional settlement. In particular, they appear to have required
a sharp reduction in the national government's scope. I suggest,
however, that the present constitutional moment, if it is one, may
concern that government's structure more than its scope.9 '
One version of the constitutional synthesis arrived at several
decades after the New Deal is that the Constitution required the
national government to exercise its expansive powers (acquired
during the New Deal constitutional moment) in the service of
individual rights (defined as a special constitutional concern at the
Founding and during Reconstruction). Cass Sunstein, for example,
stresses the description in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish' of low
' He argues
wages as "a subsidy for unconscionable employers."93
that in a constitutional regime that combines expansive national
powers and individual rights with that understanding of private
decisions, the conclusion that the government must act to remedy
these "abuses," as the Court called them, flows naturally.
Some aspects of Ackerman's account of Brown v. Board of
Education94 and Griswold v. Connecticut95 fit with this broad understanding of the post-New Deal settlement. The Supreme Court is
itself an institution of the expansive and activist national government. Brown and Griswold show the national government acting
aggressively, and by what the Court claimed was constitutional
compulsion, to protect individual rights."

91. The discussion that follows is heavily influenced by Sharon Swingle, The Voice of
the People: Political Process and the New Deal (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
92. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
93. SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 50.
94. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
95. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
96. I think it worth noting that Ackerman's defense of Griswold, which is more innovative than his defense of Brown, is, as I read it, quite tentative. His final words on the
case are, "Granted, when the Founders thought about personal freedom they used the
language of property and contract; given the New Deal repudiation of this language, doesn't the language of privacy provide us with the most meaningful way of preserving these Founding affirmations of liberty in an activist welfare state?" ACKERMAN,
supra note 6, at 159. I do not regard this is a purely rhetorical question, but as an invitation to critics to provide an alternative synthesis of the New Deal and Founding constitutional moments.
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Elsewhere, Ackerman offers a narrower and more traditional
understanding of the immediate aftermath of the New Deal transformation. After 1937, the Court "finally accepted" "an activist,
regulatory state ... as an unchallengeable constitutional reality."
The national government, that is, was permitted-but not required-to act. But, Ackerman argues, this understanding does not
fully synthesize the New Deal with Reconstruction. That occurred
in Carolene Products Co. v. United States," where the Court, in
"[tihe text," as Ackerman puts it, "denies once again that activist
intervention into the economy endangers fundamental constitutional
values,"' but in footnote 4 "proposes a new area of life as the
centerpiece of egalitarian concern ... [,] the structure of politics."" ° The courts would ensure the fair operation of the political
system and then validate its outcomes.
The Court abandoned the broader version of the post-New
Deal synthesis, if it ever had adopted it, in the 1970s. By treating
public assistance laws as social and economic legislation subject to
low-level rationality review,'' the Court rejected arguments that
the New Deal settlement, understood in light of our entire constitutional history, required the government to provide minimum guarantees of individual welfare.
For two decades, constitutional scholars have been comfortable
with the proposition that the New Deal settlement did not require
affirmative legislative action to protect individual rights. Adarand
2 shifts the ground entirely. Now, the
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena'0
government is not even permitted to exercise its power to promote
one legislatively determined set of individual rights. This might not
be quite so striking but for the fact that the rights at stake were
those at the heart of the Reconstruction constitutional transformation. This is not to say that Congress lacks power to define any
rights related to race, although I believe a credible legal case can
be made that Adarand casts doubt on Congress's power to ban

97.

ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 40.
98. 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
99. ACKERmAN, supra note 6, at 120.

100. Id. at 128.
101. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that a social
welfare statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause if it has some reasonable
basis); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (refusing to analyze the Texas ad valorem tax on property under strict scrutiny because no
suspect classification was created and no constitutionally protected rights were impinged).
102. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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racial discrimination by private employers. 3 If Congress cannot
define individual rights related to race, one might think, what
rights can it define and then protect?"'
In this sense Lopez and Adarand are apt companion cases.
Adarand denied the national government the power to protect one
legislatively determined set of rights. Lopez denied it the power to
advance a legislatively determined vision of the general welfare
even when individual rights were not directly implicated." Together, the cases might be taken to repudiate both the broad understanding of the post-New Deal constitutional synthesis, in which
the national government was required to act, and a narrower understanding, in which it was permitted to act.
Such a reading of the cases poses severe difficulties within
Ackerman's theory. For, according to Ackerman, the courts' job is
to synthesize all our constitutional moments. They can hardly do so
if one constitutional moment is best understood as rejecting an
earlier one.
In a provocative paper, Sharon Swingle suggests that we can
continue to understand the Court's recent decisions within
Ackerman's theory by recharacterizing the New Deal constitutional
moment."°6 The recharacterization, in turn, leads to a different understanding of the Court's decisions. Instead of dealing with the
national government's scope, they deal with its structure.
According to Ackerman, in the immediate aftermath of a
constitutional moment, the courts provide what he calls a
particularistic synthesis. In the early 1940s, the justices understood
what had happened in 1937 as the triumph of the New Court over
103. Such statutes are facially neutral statutes with a disparately favorable impact on
racial minorities, an impact ordinarily intended by the legislature. One can read Adarand
to subject such statutes to strict scrutiny: Under Washington v. Davis, facially neutral
statutes with a disparate adverse impact on racial minorities, intended by the legislature,
are subject to strict scrutiny. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). According
to Adarand's principle of "consistency," under which the standard of review "is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification," 115 S.
Ct. at 2110, strict scrutiny should be applied to facially neutral statutes with an intended
beneficial impact on racial minorities (I am endebted to L. Michael Seidman for his help
in getting me to see this point.).
104. Current cases testing the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
raise this question directly. See also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. CL 2475, 2491 (1995)
(discussing the relative role of courts and executive departments in interpreting the Constitution).
105. One might note here that crime-control measures can sensibly be defended on the
ground that they protect the individual rights to life and liberty of law-abiding people.
106. Swingle, supra note 91.
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the Old Court, a repudiation of what they understood to be judicial
activism on behalf of an order that had lost legislative power but
retained allies in the courts. Relying on their recollection of the
events immediately surrounding the crisis of 1937, the justices'
first synthesis was a general theory of judicial restraint, articulated
most forcefully by Felix Frankfurter.
Even at the time, however, they understood the synthesis of
the New Deal with the Founding and Reconstruction in somewhat
broader terms. The theory of judicial restraint did not float freely,
independent of concern for other government institutions. Rather,
the justices justified it on the ground that legislative decisions
generally deserved respect because they were the product of democratic processes. In Ackerman's own account, Carolene Products is
the key. Judicial restraint was justified as part of a democratic
system, but if democracy functioned badly because obvious prerequisites like free access to the ballot box were absent, the reason for
restraint disappeared.
The jurisprudence of Carolene Products focused on what I
°7
have called formal obstacles to democratic decision-making.1
The next stage in the synthesis expands the focus to include informal obstacles. Swingle suggests that Adarand and Lopez concern
such obstacles.'
John Hart Ely, the modern expositor of a
Carolene Products approach, defended affirmative action programs
on the ground that they involved whites imposing disadvantages on
themselves." Understanding the politics of affirmative action differently, Justice Scalia saw it as the product of interest group deals
benefiting some African Americans at the expense of working-class
whites." 0 Adarand shows that the Court agrees. Interest group
deals as such are hardly defects in democracy, but, on this version
of the post-New Deal synthesis, they do threaten to generate public
policy that a majority would in fact repudiate. Swingle argues
persuasively that the Court has attempted to domesticate what it
sees as the pathologies of interest group politics by confining the

107. TUSHNEr, supra note 70, at 72-73.
108. Swingle, supra note 91, at 34-45.
109. John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm!. L.
REV. 723, 727 (1974) (suggesting that it is not constitutionally suspect for any majority to
discriminate against itself).
110. Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must
First Take Account of Race", 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 147 (suggesting that the Supreme
Court decisions on affirmative action seem to be "tied together by threads of social preference and predisposition").
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scope of interest group politics to "social and economic interests..'. Similarly, Swingle argues, the statute invalidated in
Lopez resulted from a defect in democratic decision-making because the Gun-Free School Zones Act allowed members of Congress to claim credit for fighting street crime when substantive
federal legislation has little effect on such crime."2
This account of the post-New Deal synthesis arguably deepens
the Roosevelt Court's concern for ensuring that public policy results from a well-functioning democratic system while preserving
the products of such a system from aggressive judicial review. At
the same time, it seems somewhat divorced from the realities of
the Court's decisions, and perhaps unnecessarily apologetic in constructing a rationale for decisions that may be indefensible."'
Conceding that the post-New Deal Court might properly be understood as attempting to police the operation of a deeply democratic
system, we might wonder whether the defects the Court purports to
have identified, on this reading, are either real defects or the ones
deserving its most urgent attention. For present purposes, I think it
worth noting only that this is a question that arises within
Ackerman's framework, and does not make the framework itself
any less interesting." 4

111. Swingle, supra note 91, at 34-42; see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475,
2490 (1995) (referring to "the fractured political, social, and economic interests within the
Eleventh District's black population").
112. Swingle, supra note 91, at 42-45. As Vicki Jackson pointed out to me, such provisions also provide opportunities for federal prosecutors to take over some high profile
cases without being responsible for prosecuting the more routine cases that have greater
impact on the way in which people experience crime. See also New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-66 (1992) (describing diffusion of political responsibility when
Congress "commandeers" state legislatures).
113. In this, the argument bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the accounts of National League of Cities v. Usery in Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977), which argues that the Court may not be restricting personal
rights, but that it may be taking a step signifying the recognition of affirmative rights
necessary to a constitutional order, and Frank Michelman, States' Rights and States'
Roles: Permutations of Sovereignty in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE LJ.
1165 (1977), which argues that "the NLC decision proves unsupportable except as it
depends on a perception that 'states as states' under the Constitution are imbued with
affirmative duties towards their citizens." Id. at 1194.
114. I believe that the same can be said about the almost universal skepticism critics
have expressed about Ackerman's account of Brown v. Board of Education and Griswold
v. Connecticut. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Dualism and Its Status, 104 ETHICS 480, 494
(1994); Klarman, supra note 29, at 765, 785-91 (arguing that Ackerman does not simply
describe our regime, but prescribes it); Sandalow, supra note 35, at 334-36 (suggesting
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The Court's present position, as I have constructed it, remains
concerned with constitutional structures rather than with the
government's scope. Does this account of the Court's recent decisions imply that the Court has accepted the proposition that we are
now in a new constitutional moment? In one sense, no: all the
Court has done is recharacterize the post-New Deal synthesis. In
another sense, yes: the reason for the recharacterization is to allow
the Court to synthesize the 1994 elections and the Contract With
America with the New Deal's constitutional transformation.
B.

Characterizing the Present

My argument so far has been highly speculative, as it must be
given the uncertainties about the significance of Lopez and the
events and decisions with which I have connected it. I will conclude on an even more speculative note, returning to the question
of government's scope. Enthusiasts of state and local power have
heralded Lopez and some aspects of the Contract With America as
embodying a well-deserved devolution of power from nation to
state and local governments.
Despite the clear tenor of most discussions of recent political
developments, I suggest that the present constitutional moment, if it
is one, may involve the evaporation rather than devolution of public power."' That is, power may not be flowing from Congress
to state and local governments, but rather going into thin air-or,
more precisely, to private institutions, both in the United States and
elsewhere." 6 As British scholar James Anderson puts it, "sovereignty, having been 'bundled' into modem territorial states, is now

that Ackerman has not resolved the question of whether the individual freedom of
Griswold includes sexual freedom). Although, as indicated above, see supra text accompanying notes 53-55, I find elements of Ackerman's account more plausible than many of
his critics do, one could fully accept the criticisms and nonetheless think Ackerman's
theory worthwhile. The accounts of those cases are, after all, only particularized casestudies within Ackerman's framework, and even the creator of such a framework may do
better at the general level than on a more particularized one.
115. The term evaporation is used in Susan Strange, The Defective State, DAEDALUS,
Spring 1995, at 55, 56, (suggesting that state authority has leaked away or evaporated),
although I had come up with it before reading her article.
116. For a thoughtful overview of these and related developments, see Vincent Cable,
The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power, DAEDALUS, Spring
1995, at 23, 23-24, which notes that "the nation-state has 'lost' power to regional and
global institutions and to markets but has also acquired new areas of control in order to
promote 'national competitiveness.' The idea here is related to, but different from, the

proposition that the current moment involves a reduction in the national government's
scope. Power that evaporates is actually transferred to private institutions.
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being 'unbundled'.""' 7
I am quite tentative here, and so offer only a short list of
developments suggesting the evaporation of public power."'
(1) The increased pace of deregulation: Deregulatory efforts
on the national level might leave matters to state law. Recently,
however, deregulatory proposals have been combined with broader
forms of preemption. As a result, neither national nor state governments can displace the privately negotiated solutions worked out
by employers and employees, or by sellers and buyers. The best
examples come from the quite powerful preemptive effect of federal pension law," 9 but recent decisions regarding consumer protection law have a similar though somewhat weaker effect." These
decisions preserve what might be called the background state common law,'2' but even here efforts to deregulate by displacing
common-law rules of medical malpractice by statute and punitive
damages both by statute and constitutional interpretation suggest
the transfer of power from the public to private actors.
(2) The transformation of the "social safety net": Public assistance programs will soon take the form of block grants of federal
funds to state authorities. On their face these represent only the
devolution of national power. If, as seems likely, state governments

117. James Anderson, 'Arrested Federalisation'?:Europe, Britain, Ireland, in FEDERALISM: THE MULTIErHNIC CHALLENGE 279, 291 (Graham Smith ed., 1995).
118. A recent court of appeals decision invalidating a federal statute authorizing the
Secretary of the Interior to acquire property to be held in trust for Indians as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, South Dakota v. Department of Interior, 69 F.3d
878 (8th Cir. 1995), may be reconciled with this argument if we assume that Congress
will fail to replace the statute with one providing guidance to the Secretary. In that event,
Native Americans will be left to their own devices in their efforts to obtain a secure
economic basis for their communities.
119. For an overview, see David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State
Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PrrT. L. REv. 427 (1987), which suggests
that ERISA preemption of state employee benefit law is extensive. Id. at 429.
120. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 391 (1992) (holding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts state consumer protection law regulating
airline fare advertising).
121. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 820 (1995) (holding
that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts "state-imposed regulation" but allows "court
enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves"); see also Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (concluding that a taking occurs
when all economically viable use is destroyed unless owner's activity is barred by "common-law principles" of nuisance).
122. By this formulation, I do not mean to deny the standard Legal Realist point that
the powers exercised by private actors ultimately rest on public decisions to allocate power to those actors.
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find themselves fiscally constrained by a combination of balancedbudget requirements in state constitutions and a political system
that makes tax increases extremely difficult to enact, the social
safety net will unravel further." Private charity will assist some.
Off-the-books employment at sub-minimum wages may help others.
Still others will be left to their own resources. In all its variants,
the new social safety net relies on private actors rather than public
power.
(3) Constitutional innovations in international trade: The socalled globalization of the U.S. economy has already generated
some constitutional innovations. 4 Laurence Tribe argued, for example, that "the legal regime put in place by the Uruguay Round
[of trade negotiations] represents a structural rearrangement of
state-federal relations of the sort that requires ratification ... as a
'
Treaty. '""s
No such ratification occurred.
Tribe's position rests on a contestable interpretation of the
Constitution, and the process by which the United States became
part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) may not be a constitutional innovation at all. More interesting, perhaps, is a proposal
that emerged during the deliberations over the WTO. Concerned
that WTO decisions would unduly affect U.S. sovereignty, Senator
Robert Dole has introduced the WTO Dispute Settlement Review
Commission Act." The Commission would review reports by
WTO dispute settlement panels to determine whether the WTO has
"exceeded its authority . . . added to the obligations of or diminished the rights of the United States ... acted arbitrarily or capriciously ... [or] deviated from the applicable standard of review.""IV If the Commission makes three such findings in a fiveyear period, Congress may enact a resolution withdrawing the
United States from the WTO.

123. See Richard Janda, Reviving Federalism: Canadian Reflections on an American
Dream, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 207, 212-15 (1994) (noting how Canada has experienced
race-to-the-bottom problems associated with tax abatements and subsidies).
124. Ackerman and Golove examine what they regard as the constitutional innovations
associated with the manner in which NAFTA became law. Ackerman & Golove, supra
note 18. For a contrary view, see Laurence Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV.
1221 (1995), which rejects the "free-form" method of Ackerman and Golove's analysis of
NAFTA. Id. at 1227.
125. Letter from Laurence Tribe to Senator Robert Byrd, July 19, 1994, reprinted in
140 CONG. REC. S10584-85 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994).
126. S. 16, 104th Congress, 1st Sess. (1995).
127. Id.
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Senator Dole's proposal is unremarkable except for the way in
which the Commission is to be composed. Its members are to be
five federal circuit court judges, appointed by the President after
consultation with the congressional leadership." This may well
go beyond Mistretta v. United States.'29 There, the United States
Sentencing Commission could plausibly be described as doing
something judicial. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 revised the
old sentencing process, and, as Justice Blackmun put it, the Commission aggregated in a single body the sentencing power previously dispersed throughout the federal judiciary. 30
In one sense, the WTO Review Commission would be acting
judicially: Its charge would be to examine whether the WTO's
panels have acted in a manner consistent with the law they are to
administer. And presumably the Act proposes to use federal judges
because they are more likely than any other appointees to be free
from the pressures of interest groups associated with trade disputes.
The relation between the Review Commission's reports and congressional action, however, evokes the specter of Hayburn's
Case,' where the Justices said that they could not be required to
perform extra-judicial activity. Such activity has come to be defined as activity subject to revision by the President or Congress.' If the proposed Act becomes law, we may have to rethink some fundamentals about federal courts.
International trade law has already produced a constitutional
innovation in the dispute settlement procedure under the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, carried over into
NAFTA."' United States law provides for trade sanctions if a

128. Id.
129. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
130. Id. at 387.
131. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
132. For a recent reaffirmation of this principle, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115
S. Ct. 1447, 1457 (1995), which notes that "Congress can always revise the judgment of
Article III courts in one sense. When a new law makes it clear that it is retroactive, an
appellate court must apply that law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted, and must alter the outcome accordingly."
133. Many commentators have discussed these provisions. See, e.g., Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral Review Under the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455, 1457
(1992) (concluding that the free trade agreement violates both Article IH and the Appointments Clause of Article II); Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Constitutional Dimensions of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141, 142 (1994) (concluding that the binational review system violates Article 11); Thomas W. Bark, Note, The
Binational Panel Mechanism for Reviewing United States-Canadian Antidumping and
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foreign trade practice causes "material injury" to U.S. producers.
The question of whether a trade practice does cause such an injury
is a question of U.S. law: what do the statutory terms mean, what
did Congress intend in enacting them, and the like. Under the
Trade Agreement and NAFTA, however, this question of U.S. law
is not resolved by a U.S. court with judges appointed under Article
III. Instead, it is to be determined finally and unreviewably by a
binational panel, composed of two U.S. members, two Canadian (or
Mexican) members, and a fifth member chosen by those four. 34
Again, there is nothing remarkable about judges without Article I status determining U.S. law. I suspect that foreign judges do
so with some regularity. What is remarkable is finding a decisionmaker appointed under the authority of the United States determining questions of federal law without any possibility of review by
an Article III judge. The constitutionality of such an arrangement
has been one of the most contentious issues in the law of federal
courts, with a rather strong consensus that such unreviewability is
of dubious constitutionality." 5
As with the proposed WTO Review Commission, the exigencies of globalization may have induced the resolution of constitutional questions that earlier generations found extremely difficult. In
a decade or so, U.S. constitutionalists may look back and see that
a constitutional transformation occurred in the 1990s. "Globalization," according to a British observer, "is largely private sector
driven. It represents ... a shift in the locus of decision-making
not only from the nation-state to transnational actors but also from

Countervailing Duty Determinations: A Constitutional Dilemma?, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 681,
682 (1989) (concluding that the binational review system is likely to withstand constitutional inquiries); Peter Huston, Note, Antidumping and Countervailing Dispute Settlement
Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Is the Process Constitutional?, 23
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 529, 530 (1990) (arguing that provisions for the free trade
agreement's review panel does not violate either the separation of powers doctrine or due
process of law); Gilad Ohana, Note, The Constitutionality of the United States-Canada
Free-Trade Agreement: Article III and the Minimum Scope of Judicial Review, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 897, 898 (1989) (arguing that the limits placed on the scope of judicial review
of the free trade agreement are constitutionally permissible). For a detailed discussion of
the revisions introduced by NAFFA, see Andrew K. Rosa, Note, Old Wine, New Skins:
NAFTA and the Evolution of International Trade Dispute Resolution, 15 MICH. L INT'L L.
255, 258 (1993), which identifies weaknesses in NAFTA's dispute resolution system.
134. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
LL.M. 289, 605, annex 1901.2(1)-(3), at 687; Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.Can., 27 I.L.M. 293, annex 1901.2(l)-(3), at 393.
135. For citations to the literature, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
172-73 nn. 3-6, 181-84, 186 n. 1 (2d ed. 1994).
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national governments to the private sector. 1 3 6 It would have been
accompanied by the transfer of national power to private entities in
the United States and elsewhere. As British political economist
Susan Strange puts it, "[government] authority has leaked away,
upwards, sideways, and downwards. In some matters, it seems even
to have gone nowhere, just evaporated."'37
In Ackerman's schema, however, the question is whether the
evaporation of national power can be connected to popular sovereignty in some way. If these developments connected to international trade are rationalized by interpreting the Constitution to
accommodate them, constitutional development would occur in the
normal way: A prior act of popular sovereignty-Article III, the
Constitution's treaty-making provisions-licenses the courts to
modify constitutional arrangements without a present act of popular
mobilization.
Ackerman's schema is designed to connect large-scale constitutional transformations-regime-shifts-to popular mobilizations.
Ackerman's discussion of the transformation of foreignpolicymaking authority after World War II acknowledges that a
large-scale change did occur.'38 The popular mobilization during
the War created the conditions for consensual endorsement of that
change. I find Ackerman's account unpersuasive as an interpretive
account of national identity. Klarman's assessment of the accretion
of presidential power, for example, seems more accurate. But, if
Ackerman is wrong, we may already have experienced a regimetransformation without popular mobilization. That might well make
impossible a celebratory account of national identity. But it may be
what is now occurring, or, more precisely, what is continuing to
occur. Perhaps in a few decades, constitutionalists will call the
1990s a constitutional moment that occurred behind the backs of
the People. That conclusion, of course, disconnects regime-transformation from popular sovereignty. It may nonetheless better characterize modem constitutional developments than Ackerman's theory.
These developments open up a deeper question about
Ackerman's theory. As I have argued, its normative force comes
from its focus on the construction of an American national identity,

136. Cable, supra note 116, at 37.
137. Strange, supra note 115, at 56; see also Cable, supra note 116, at 38 (concluding
that "[n]ational economic sovereignty is being eroded, slowly and differentially, not eliminated").
138. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 18, at 689-96.
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because supra-individual identity is a basic human good. Why,
however, is the most important supra-individual identity a national
identity? Globalization suggests that we might more profitably
think about the constitutional implications of transnational identi139
ties.
III.

CONCLUSION

It is too early to tell whether something happened in the 1994
Term of the Supreme Court." If it did, however, I believe that
Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments may provide the best
account. In any event, I hope to have shown that Ackerman's
theory sheds light on recent constitutional developments even if it
does not fully explain them.

139. Such identities can be those commonly discussed in contemporary identity politics-race, gender, sexual orientation-which are, to their proponents, significantly transnational. Or, they might be transnational identities of an earlier time-the international working class, for example.
140. I do here intend the allusion to Joseph Heller's Something Happened, where the
reader does not learn what happened until well into the book. See JOsEPH HELLER, SoMETING HAPPENED (1974).

